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NEUTRALITY
By EDWIN BORCHARD*
BEFORE 1914, it was hard to find much difference of opinion among
American citizens about the proper policy of the United States in rela-
tion to foreign wars or even foreign affairs. That policy, with respect
to Europe, was dictated by geographical factors and by a colonial and
continental history that left little room for debate. Detachment from
Europe's political entanglements, non-intervention in its internal affairs,
and neutrality in its wars were the keynotes. After 1898 the acquisition
of Asiatic possessions turned America to a Pacific orientation marked by
uncertainty and the assumption of unnecessary risks. The desire to play
a leading part, without adequate equipment thereto, led to poorly com-
prehended commitments on the Open Door, and exposed the United States
to temptations to intervene which even the proposed withdrawal from the
Philippines has not suppressed. On the American continent, a more nat-
ural political interest, accentuated by propinquity in Central America,
prompted occasional intervention and a standing warning to Europe
against political encroachment.
After 1914 a marked change occurred, especially in relation to Europe.
For a variety of causes set out in numerous books, America lost its bear-
ings. The magnitude of the European contest, association of cultural
and economic interests with one side, and extraordinary ineptness in deal-
ing with the legal problems involved, ultimately induced a state of hys-
teria which plunged the nation into war. The European feud, more
senseless than its predecessors of earlier centuries, was pictured as a
struggle between morality and immorality, and in the search for an
explanation to the American public for the country's departure from its
fundamental traditions, there was invented at the last minute that curious
battle-cry of making the world "safe for democracy". This must have
surprised some of the Allied governments. It was in that era that there
was born the ideal of allied force in the service of righteousness, later
called "collective security", which has done so much to prolong the world's
misery by viewing the world through the doctrinaire spectacles of politi-
cal theology instead of with the open-minded detachment of a physician
seeking a correct diagnosis of a social disease. The war produced a psy-
chosis, continued in the Treaty of Versailles and its aftermath, of which
Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant were an exemplification rather than
an antidote. Historians and psychologists will in due course explain why
some of the principal governments of the western world so long divorced
themselves from reason and experience, and immersed in illusions, per-
mitted the corrosion of the political and economic structure.
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For it is an unfortunate fact that the attempt to maintain the adven-
titious status quo of 1919 through devices of the Covenant and by more
formal military alliance resulted in an intensification of nationalism almost
unprecedented. At the same time, the less informed were led to believe
that phrases such as "collective security", interpreted by the League of
Nations, manifested a growing internationalism and disposition to adopt
peaceful processes in the adjustment of international differences. The
disintegration, however, was a fact, the pacification but a fiction. When
we consider the progress that had been made in the 19th and early 20th
centuries in the development of arbitration and conciliation, it seems de-
plorable that since 1917 the world's moving forces should have conic
under the domination of a psychology which encouraged treaties and pacts
signally devoid of conditions essential to international appeasement, while
cherishing the delusion that peace was being promoted by arrangements
for the use of combined force against any revolter against the status quo,
vilified in advance by the opprobrious name of "aggressor". Of this pro-
cess perhaps the most unfortunate phase was the popular illusion that
peace might be assured by bestowing seductive names such as "collective
security", "preventing war", "international cooperation", on contrivances,
like sanctions, which were hostile and warlike in character. In defense
of this form of deception, it can only be said that it was not new. Article
47 of the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, embodied a similar device. As
Judge John Bassett Moore has said, all human history is characterized by
the tendency to seek salvation in phrases rather than in acts.
We were told during the Great War that the balance of power and
military alliances were the source of the world's ills and that these ills
could be cured by replacing alliances with a League of Nations-once
inadvertently called a "disentangling alliance". But just as an alliance
is a combination of two or more nations seeking certain common ends, so
the "collective security" of the League was marked by an identical char-
acteristic-it sought the attainment of common ends by the use of co-
ercion and military force. But it is to be feared that the education of
men's minds to the compulsive features of "collective security" has had
disastrous effects. It has diminished appreciation and respect for the less
dramatic peaceful processes of effecting change and settling disputes. It
has led to a disparagement of the century-old peace-preserving institu-
tion of neutrality, with which the theory of united coercion is incompati-
ble. It has induced a revival of ancient and unworkable theoretical dis-
tinctions between a just and an unjust war. It has caused a denunciation
of tried experience and detachment in seeking sensibly to understand and
hence intelligently to conciliate conflicting claims. Indeed it has brought
about a practice of passing moral judgments upon national ambitions and
mass movements, in the name of a supposedly ideal scheme the real char-
acter and practical effect of which its votaries failed adequately to pene-
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trate. One of the sad concomitants of this tragedy of errors is the neglect
of those elementary considerations of human experience which distinguish
friendship from hostility, peace from war, conciliation from intransige-
ance, negotiation from dictation. Indeed, it was not uncommon to hear the
developments of the 19th century decried and depreciated as international
anarchy, because forsooth the European War broke in 1914, whereas the
"new" system of "enforcing peace" was extolled as ushering in the reign
of wisdom, justice and righteousness. This system was pictured as the
"new" international law; hence all the old law that conflicted with the
ideal had to be attacked as obsolete if not indeed obstructive. Neutrality,
a hard-won institution which since the 16th century had served to keep a
large part of the world at peace under the regulation of law, an institu-
tion which peacemakers had cherished as one of the most constructive
achievements of a slowly developing civilization, fell under the ban of the
"new" school of peace through combined force. And so effectively did
this false theory help to prevent the rebirth of the process of appeasement
that the world now stands aghast before the new disasters which threaten.
In a less hysterical age, the "new" theory could not have gained so many
adherents. For its perpetuation, it was necessary to keep up the fictions
of the War and to disregard time-tested axioms concerning the nature, the
growth and administration of international relations. Disregarded were
the fundamental differences between the formulation of municipal law
within a state, handed down by a recognized superior alone possessing the
instruments of societal coercion, and the growth of the more primitive
international system which develops by custom and treaty among equals,
in which there is no superior legislator, no authorized enforcing agent for
the group, no disarmament of the constituent members. These differences
were glossed over, and a scheme was devised for judging fellow-members
and enforcing the judgment by combined coercion.
Such a system postulates a mature society with an authorized law-giver,
obligatory adjudication, willingness to accept adverse judgments or socie-
tal coercion. It assumes that the judges are unbiased, actuated only
by objective considerations. Among sovereign nations such a system is
a wishful dream. So long as it seemed to serve the interests of certain
states, nothing was done to puncture the illusion; but the moment that the
system came up against the ambitions of strong Powers, in or outside the
League, the sorry truth was revealed. And now, even its original sponsors
and supposed beneficiaries have turned their backs upon the illusion,
hoping against hope to recover the lost ground of negotiation, conciliation
and appeasement as the only practical methods of preventing war.
But for the fact that the unfortunate ideology of Articles 10 and 16
preached oblivion for neutrality, and especially American neutrality, it
would not be necessary to spend so much time and space in exposing the
dangers of the "new" system. But its devotees were fond of drawing the
193s1
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
analogy to a private legal system or to personal relations, and asked, "If
a bully assaults Mr. Milquetoast, you wouldn't stand by in safe neutrality
and watch the unfair assault, would you ?" This seemed to the propound-
ers unanswerable. But only slight examination will disclose the impro-
priety of the analogy. Nations, like all living organisms, are subject to
the law of evolution and life. At any given time, some will flourish, others
decline. If a nation is virile and prolific, if the doors to emigration are
largely shut, if it lacks raw materials and markets, if it sees less sturdy
neighbors in possession of colonial resources, the urge to expansion may
become irresistible-even though expansion be unwise and unprofitable.
These are biological considerations, in which ethics play only a minor
role. Unless then the world is prepared to recognize and satisfy such a
country's needs or assumed needs by negotiation, an explosion is quite
possible. Some weakly held territory or aging state is then in danger.
This has been the traditional, if unfortunate, method of readjusting the
tenure of the earth's crust, and until we find a better method, the old
one will be hard completely to outlaw. Should third states venture to
intervene, they would risk the welfare of their own people and would be
morally obliged to furnish a solution for the problem of over-population,
poverty, lack of markets, etc.' Heretofore, experience has shown that it
is not wise to interfere in such issues, unless some national interest is at
stake. This may not seem altruistic, but it has proved the only practical
way of avoiding even greater evils. Had the Hoare-Laval compromise
been accepted by the emotional adherents of collective security in England,
some of the humiliations and disasters that subsequently developed might
have been avoided. It may be better under some circumstances to permit
a political readjustment, even territorial, than to seek to endow an exist-
ing status quo with moral sanctity. State ethics and personal ethics are
not identical. A government is responsible for the life and prosperity
of its own people, and dare not risk their very existence on the adven-
turous effort to right distant "wrongs", the origin of which it may not
understand and should not seek to oversimplify. Intervention is a delicate
instrument. Ineptly employed, it might be calamitous. Hence experience
has dictated its reservation for exceptional cases only, in which vital in-
terests are at stake. The theory that war anywhere justifies intervention,
that "peace is indivisible", is merely the thoughtless jargon of "collective
security".
But it is a fact that the destructiveness of modern war makes it more
important than ever to avoid its recurrence. What has been done since
1917 is no contribution to that end. The interdependence of a narrowing
world might have been remembered at Versailles. If the constant danger
of war is to be surmounted, thought should be given to the revival of the
1. We may leave aside for the moment the equally potent historical and psycho.
logical causes of conflict.
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well-tried methods of restoring trust among the nations and then working
to develop the existing institutions for cooperative effort to appease, con-
ciliate and adjust conflicting claims. The task is now infinitely more
difficult than it was before April 6, 1917, when the United States offi-
cially abandoned neutrality.
II
Before discussing the recent American neutrality legislation and the
possibilities of its revision, it may be well to dispose of certain illusions
commonly associated with the supposed function of international law
in preserving peace. It will then be necessary to show that the very idea
of "enforcing peace" by collective coercion has done much harm, and has
weakened the law. That is true also of the notion that all treaties are
sacred and that neutrality has become obsolete.
1. That hiternatioal law should preserve pcace. A distinction must
be made between international politics and international law. Only after
politics has done its work does law enter the field. International law, for
example, did not make the treaties of 1919. They were the result of poli-
tics. Law cannot control all the political action of states and statesmen,
inspired as they often are by biological, historical, and psychological im-
pulses and grievances. Nor does international law control those internal
policies of states, such as the size of armies, navies, and tariff walls, which
lie close to the foundation of international political relations. Much inter-
national action, therefore, has roots in primitive urges which escape com-
pulsory or legal control. Law, moreover, must take human and national
nature as it finds it, and can only regulate that part of state conduct which
by custom and treaty has proved susceptible to control by definite rule.
This covers a considerable field, such as delimitation of jurisdiction among
the states, their daily diplomatic intercourse in the conclusion and con-
struction of treaties, the protection of citizens abroad, the settlement of
disputes and the rules of war and neutrality.
But law cannot dictate national policy, nor does it as yet have much
control over the competition for prestige and power which is inherent in
the international system. In other words, the bulk of those factors which
make for conflict are political. To hold international law responsible for
controlling these dynamic political forces is to misunderstand the nature
of the forces and the nature of law. It had been the effort of interna-
tional law, operating with the admittedly sensitive sovereign nation-state,
to endeavor to take ever wider areas of international action out of the
domain of pure politics and bring them into the domain of law. Much
success had been achieved, as in extradition, administrative unions, and
arbitration. But that process, voluntary and resting on persuasion, re-
quires trust and a cooperative spirit among the nations. What we have
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seen in the last generation has not been calculated to promote either trust
or genuine cooperation.
2. That "collective security" is workable or beneficial. What has been
said indicates that there is no such thing as "collective security". It is a
benevolent slogan. Its use is characteristic of the modern era of debating
issues with a vocabulary of seductive catchwords. In practice we have
found that the collectivists do not remain collected and that the divergence
of their interests is disclosed as soon as they are asked to act. The theory
ofArticle 16 of the Covenant implies that states may undertake war in
the interests of other nations, not in their own. But European nations
at least do not act on such awkward theories.
Notwithstanding this impracticability, the system of threat, of boycott
and of sanctions, superimposed on the "peace" treaties, has produced col-
lective insecurity on a scale hitherto unknown. It has brought collateral
misfortunes not originally contemplated. The very threat of cutting a
nation off from its necessary supplies at a time when it may need them
most is not conducive to trust or cooperation. It produces fear and bit-
terness and a determination to become self-sufficient, thus diminishing
international trade. It also creates a special incentive to the conquest of
the territory and materials that are needed for national self-sufficiency,
for no nation wishes to be at the mercy of others in the present period of
collective and reciprocal distrust and fear.
No one denies that it is unfortunate that nations on occasion erupt and
invade foreign territory. But when one examines history it cannot be
called novel. The real issue is, "has anything been done to neutralize the
causes and incentives of eruption?"
I think the no's have it. Until we find some better way of making erup-
tions unnecessary by taking into full account the manifold reasons for
readjustment or expansion, we shall have to accept the lesser evil of
occasional individual small wars as against the greater evil of collective
or world wars. But only in an intelligent, understanding and deflation of
the causes of conflict is there hope of diminishing the outbursts of na-
tional ambition. Nor can nations be made safe by external combinations
from the consequences of their own mismanagement and ineptitude, of
enfeebled population and diminishing resources, material and spiritual.
Many nations do themselves more harm than do outsiders. The attempt
to uphold a decaying status quo might be anything but constructive. Na-
tional territory is not like personal property, with possession guaranteed
by law. National territory is held in more precarious tenure. So long as
its occupants are able materially to defend it, and so long as powerful
neighbors find it preferable and politic to manifest self-restraint, the occu-
pants are likely to retain possession. Constant alertness is an incident of
statehood. These matters lie in the field of politics.
(Vol. 48: 37
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3. That all treaties are sacred. Treaties are not like private contracts.
Treaties vary in scope and character. The more political the treaty the
more vulnerable it is to change and obsolescence. The more legal it is, the
more likely it is to be conscientiously observed.
Political treaties record political arrangements. If the political arrange-
ment is sound, in the interest of all the signatories, and embraces more
or less permanent conditions, the treaty confirming it is likely to survive.
If the political arrangement is artificial, not responsive to actual physical
conditions or potential change, the treaty recording it is likely to be
broken and to disappear. Heretofore, these questions were considered in
the field of 'politics. Now by an excess of virtue and misunderstanding
they seem to have been transferred to the field of morals. This brings
confusion rather than appeasement to international relations.
Peace treaties imposed under duress are necessarily vulnerable. We
had not heretofore assumed that there was a moral issue involved in
maintaining a peace treaty that no longer reflected the distribution of
force which made the treaty possible. The idea that the treaties of Ver-
sailles, Saint Germain, Trianon and Neuilly laid the foundation of a new
legal order which ought to be sanctified neither amuses nor instructs.
In fact, it defies experience. Peace treaties are likely to survive when
they correctly reflect the new distribution of power and obtain a moderate
acquiescence from the vanquished. By and large, the Americans and the
British have been good peace makers, because as a rule they did not over-
reach themselves but looked intelligently to the future. Such perspicacity
was not particularly in evidence around Paris in 1919.
To denounce the disruption of such peace treaties as immoral is not
impressive. Disruption is a natural consequence of unintelligent treaties.
It is not a question of justice or of dictation but of workability. So, with
less important political treaties, such as the Nine-Power Pact. Such
treaties are temporary inodi vh'endi. They are usually sufficiently vague
so that no legal case can be built out of them. But even if they were
precise enough to permit that, they would still be vulnerable to the dynam-
ics of political change.
The Nine-Power Treaty was based on a condition contrary to fact-
the supposed territorial and administrative integrity of China, which the
-Western Powers had done so much through the nineteenth century to
undermine. How far Japan will seek to close the door of opportunity in
China remains to be seen. The Western Powers will be heard in that
matter, and Japan will probably not run the risks which exclusion of
Western opportunity would entail. But to make a moral issue out of
Japan's attempt to substitute pro-Japanese for anti-Japanese government-
in China-especially after the admissions of the Lansing-Ishii agree-
ment-or to invoke the deceptively hollow Kellogg Pact, with its reserva-
tion of the privilege of waging wars of defense, of which each signatory
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is the exclusive judge, is to invite war on conditions hardly propitious.
Just now, the Kellogg Pact looks like a temptation to intervention and
war. To assume that certain countries, and certain countries only, incur
the obloquy of "treaty-breaker" is to overlook the necessary differences
in types of treaty and to elicit invidious comparisons which may disclose
forgotten skeletons in the national cupboard. Treaties should be ob-
served and for the most part are observed. But there is no profit in grow-
ing maudlin because vague political modi vivendi become obsolete by
change of circumstances. The doubter might peruse the evolution of the
constitutional provision that no state shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of contract. The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case- is
but an exemplification of the fact that even contracts must yield to the
exigencies of changed conditions and public needs.
And here another fact deserves consideration. The growing tendency
of peace-lovers to arouse public opinion on behalf of the outlawry of
war, compulsory arbitration and non-intervention has forced nations to
subscribe treaties committing themselves, in principle, never to make war
or to suppress it by joint action, and to submit all disputes to arbitration
or conciliation. Good as the intention of the proponents of these meas-
ures may be, their efforts have not always proved constructive, because
they were making demands on nations which nations could not fulfill-
the world being what it is. The desire to hasten peaceful processes beyond
the circumstances from which international relations spring has had a
retarding and discouraging effect. Thus, the Kellogg Pact produced nulli-
fying "reservations" which not only stultify the purpose intended, but
legalize wars in unprecedented fashion. The commitment to Article 16
has evaporated under the stress of actual facts. The demand for obliga-
tory arbitration has produced crippling exceptions, so that arbitration
has probably retrogressed. The broad commitment of the United States
to non-intervention at Montevideo was accompanied by a vague speech
designed to safeguard qualifications. If intervention in an unknown
future does take place, it will give rise to recriminations. No great nation
can conscientiously make these commitments. When they are broken or
said to be broken, it is not an evidence of obloquy or bad faith, but an
indication that such treaties should never have been signed, and that the
public opinion which insisted upon them was ill-informed. The growth
of law among the nations has a more practical and less emotional in-
spiration.
4. That neutrality is obsolete. The theory of combined group action
against the aggressor is incompatible with the neutrality of any member
of the posse comitatus. We were told that it was cowardly and immoral
to stay out of wars to suppress an aggressor.
2. 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
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What we have already seen of the development of the theory of sup-
pressing aggressors will have indicated its impracticability and its danger.
As the premise falls, the conclusion that neutrality has become immoral
or illegal should also disappear. Now that the European democracies
have abandoned the unworkable theory of coercion for the more hopeful
policy of negotiation, perhaps we shall regain our traditional respect for
neutrality. The plain fact is that only theorists had ever assumed that
neutrality had become obsolete. Throughout all the period since 1919, no
nation has repealed its neutrality laws, the Permanent Court at The
Hague has applied the obligations of neutrality, international conferences
have reaffirmed neutrality. Few professionals became so romantic as to
suppose that an institution centuries old, which had contributed enor-
mously to the localizing of wars and to the peace and tranquillity of many
nations, could be wiped out by a new paper scheme for policing the world.
But the struggle between the proponents of intervention and of neu-
trality in the United States is by no means over. The interventionist
argument for enforcing peace has aesthetic attractions which cannot be
denied. The fact that they crumble at the touch of reality does not weaken
their appeal for many people. But if neutrality were to be abrogated or
to become obsolete, the only perceivable alternative is continuous and
general war without constructive possibilities. While idealism has its
place, even in international relations, romance should be confined to
domestic relations.
From the fiery crucible of many a war there was gradually evolved a
group of principles and rules by which belligerents and neutrals achieved
reasonably definite guides for the conduct of their reciprocal relations on
land and sea. No nation was always a belligerent, and even the belliger-
ents, while under temptation to overstep the bounds, appreciated the dan-
gers of violating rules of law. Treaty, custom, prize courts, claims com-
missions, diplomatic settlements, had over a period of four centuries
developed a great body of rules founded on intelligent principles for
regulating the relations between belligerents and neutrals. These were
known to informed persons and afforded a compass by which to guide
the ship of state through dangerous waters. Belligerents had an incentive
to observe them in order to hold down claims and to avoid the risk of
adding to the list of their enemies; neutrals, in order not to expose them-
selves to legitimate criticism, damages and attack and not to risk plung-
ing their people into war.
Neutrality is an old institution, which finds its source in candor, in the
obligation to hold the scales even, to remain a friend of both belligerents,
to lend support to neither, to avoid passing judgment on the merits of
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their war. It assures both belligerents that they are dealing with a friend,
not a disguised enemy. The belligerents must know who is in the war and
who is not. Hence the importance of the neutral Government's motives
and intent.
In return for obligations assumed by a neutral, the belligerents under-
take to respect his rights as a neutral, including the right to stay out of
the war. There are those who regard this life-preserving role as insuffi-
ciently heroic and who recommend joining in foreign wars on the "right"
side as a "world service". But they seem unaware of the humiliations
which the "servant of mankind" brings to his own people and the con-
fusion which interference in foreign quarrels spreads to the rest of the
world.
This is not the place to examine how the United States slipped into
the European War in 1917. That has been documented in several re-
cently published books.3 In brief, however, the main reason is to be found
in a departure from those fundamental precepts of candor, impartiality
and detachment which neutrality imposes on a neutral. You cannot hell)
one side at the expense of the other and hope to remain neutral or escape
the penalties of unneutrality. You can't have it both ways. If you wish
to remain neutral you must also respect the obligations of neutrality,
know what is neutral and what is not, and display some capacity to han-
dle yourself. When, however, you openly disregard the rules and take
legal positions that are unsustainable, you are soon hopelessly entangled.
The Neutrality Act of 1937 was the outcome of a struggle between
two extreme groups, the sanctionists, who desired to discriminate against
the "aggressor" in the embargo of American arms and other commodi-
ties, and the insulationist Nye school, who desired first a mandatory
embargo on as many commodities as possible, then limitation of bellig-
erent trade to the pre-war quotas, then "cash-and-carry". The historic and
legal neutrals only came into the issue to endeavor to prevent either
group of extremists from running away with the law.
The sanctionist school undertook to discountenance the principle and
practice of neutrality, by seeking to obtain for the Executive the discre-
tionary power to embargo discriminatorily with as few restrictions as
possible-in other words, the power to act unneutrally.
This policy has had ardent defenders. Although it is now tinder some-
thing of a cloud, the demand for joint action of the so-called "democratic"
nations against Japan and Fascism is its direct progeny. It doubtless in-
spired the President's "quarantine" speech of October 5, 1937, in Chi-
cago. The idea is embodied in that provision of the Executive trade
agreements which permits an embargo on shipments to the disfavored
nation, not only of arms but of commodities "needed in war" or of "other
3. Cf. TANSmL, AmFmcA GoES TO WAR (1938); BORCHARD & LAGE, NEUTRAL'"
FoR TaE UNmTE STATES (1937).
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military supplies". It is perhaps not fully appreciated that a sanctions
policy and a trade promotion policy are inconsistent. The idea encour-
ages the "taking of sides" and, it is to be feared, resents obst;Wles to bel-
ligerency, such as the Ludlow Resolution for a popular referendum as a
condition of a declaration of war to be conducted on foreign soil.
A second school of thought, seeking its authority in history and in
law, and skeptical of the possibility of reforming the world by paper
formulas, has preferred to have the United States actually stay out of
foreign wars and employ the well-known standards of candid neutrality
to achieve that end. This school deplores departures from neutrality, be-
cause experience has taught that they usually mark the road to war. This
school observes that no other nations have succumbed to fanciful notions
of "discriminatory" neutrality-a contradiction in terms--or to the sac-
rificial insulation against trade with belligerents which the Nye group in
Congress would have the United States adopt.
The contribution of this neutral school to the Neutrality Act of 1937
was an insistence on impartial and equal treatment to both belligerents,
and in conjunction with the Nye group, a prohibition upon American
citizens to take passage on belligerent vessels. They would have preferred
a simple declaration that such citizens, like those in a war zone, assume
their own risks, for the prohibition may operate with severity if other
vessels are not available. This school also advocated the prohibition to
use American ports as sources of supply to cruisers at sea, and keeping
armed vessels, surface or submarine, out of American neutral ports, as
did Holland during the late war. They supported the Nye group in their
demand that a mandatory arms and loan embargo be also imposed, even
though at times an arms embargo might work hardship on weaker Powers,
as in the case of China and the Spanish Loyalists, and that the manu-
facture of arms and ammunition in each nation might thereby be aug-
mented. This school has no sympathy with the view that the United
States must inevitably be involved in a large foreign war whether it
wishes or not.
A third school of thought on neutrality is an outgrowth of the Nye
investigation on the influence of bankers and munitions makers during
the late war. This school ultimately took the initiative in 1935 in getting
legislation on the books, and some of the more drastic features of the
Act of 1937 emanate from it. This school is thoroughly neutral, has no
use for the inflammatory conception of "aggressor", and is determined
to stay out of foreign wars. It would insulate the United States through
prohibiting trade with the belligerents, so far as possible. Its intentions
are excellent. It proceeds, however, from certain premises that I think
are false, and does not make adequate allowance for the consequences of
its policies. Its position is based in part on the premise that American
neutral trade and the injuries to that trade got us into the last war and
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that, if we have little or no trade, at least in American bottoms, the in-
centive to conflict will vanish. But the picture isn't so simple as that.
Trade did not embroil the United States; it was sheer unneutrality, the
favoring of one side against the other, the writing of "strict account-
ability" notes claiming immunity for American citizens on armed and
unarmed belligerent vessels from unwarned submarine attack, and the
refusal to admit any connection between Allied and German reprisals.
Nor did the bankers or the munition makers, however interested, write
the ultimata which finally led to intervention. The economic interest, I
firmly believe, was far less a factor than political romance. No legisla-
tion can effectively prohibit that.
The other error of the Nye school, it is submitted, is the belief that
economic distress at home will have few if any repercussions. Even the
limitation of trade to pre-war proportions, for which it got Adminis-
tration support in 1936, would serve little practical purpose, and the
difficulties in the administration of such a policy would be great. Embar-
goes have had a rather sorry history in the United States, and in 1812
nearly brought about the secession of New England from the Union.
Moreover, to withhold goods from people who need them will be regarded
as a hostile act, likely to violate commercial treaties and to arouse antag-
onism and challenge. The embargo obsession, it may be hoped, will
soon pass.
The Nye school was mainly responsible for the "cash-and-carry" pro-
vision written into the Act of 1937, though it yielded to objections by
limiting the provision to two years. As contrasted with the mandatory
prohibition on arms exports and loans and travelling on belligerent ves-
sels, the cash-and-carry provision can come into effect only at Presidential
discretion and then only as to goods, presumably contraband, which the
President places on a special list. These may then be carried only in
foreign vessels and after payment in cash or short-term bills, so that
title passes out of American into foreign hands. The general theory is
that American commerce would be kept on the seas, while it would yet
be exempt from the risks of American entanglement because practically
all of it would be under foreign flag and under foreign ownership. It is
not believed to be practical, is probably unenforceable, and would un-
necessarily damage American foreign trade. Besides, in the selection of
commodities for the special list, an unneutral President could in fact aid
or injure one side, and that could hardly fail to expose the United States
to the charges and consequences of unneutrality.
There are other features of the "cash-and-carry" policy which deserve
consideration. In so far as it is designed to keep American-owned trade
and American ships out of belligerent zones and out of belligerent trade,
it will probably reduce the American market even in time of peace. An
unreliable supplier will be replaced by one more reliable. The very un-
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certainty of the commodities that may be "embargoed" stimulates the
foreign search for other sources of supply and for substitutes, even syn-
thetic. This restrictive policy contributes to the growing demand for
self-sufficiency, not to speak of conquest. The policy of the Act is thus
in conflict with the Trade Agreement policy of Secretary Hull. A con-
tinental enemy of England (or Japan) is especially exposed to the rigors
of the Act, for such a country may not be able to charter the necessary
ships or command the necessary cash. The Act would thus make the
United States the unintentional ally of England, and by furnishing a
provocation to submarine and air reprisals against American commerce
with England might arouse ill-feeling here, even though the ships sunk
might not be American.4 Should a great European War actually break
out, much of the American merchant marine, on which so much time,
thought and money has been and will be spent, is likely to be laid up in
idleness, unless neutral trade can be quickly developed. A strong Power
will find it difficult to renounce trade.
The American producers of raw materials and especially of agricul-
tural crops might find their customary markets, both in peace and in war,
greatly limited and gradually diminishing. Already the American cotton-
grower has felt the competition of Egyptian, Brazilian and, possibly
soon, Chinese cotton. Trade-restriction policies are likely to have a simi-
lar effect on other raw materials. Even the supposed secondary aim of the
Act, to withhold from belligerents the so-called sinews of war and thus
reduce their staying powers and shorten the war, an aim hardly likely
to be realized, does not warrant these untried experiments, the effects of
which on American commence can hardly be anything but deleterious. An
inept or unneutral administration will not be deterred by these restric-
tions from incurring the risks of intervention, for the many provisions
of the Act which come into effect only at Presidential discretion afford
plenty of opportunity to take sides or involve the United States.' The
further possible purpose of the restrictions, to prevent a war boom in the
United States, is more likely to be attained, although there are consider-
able foreign credits available to several potential European belligerents.
Although the Act is popularly called a Neutrality Act-Senator Pit-
man called it the Peace Act of 1937-numerous provisions have no rela-
tion to neutrality, but purport to constitute an attempt to avoid American
4. Goods, other than arms, which the President fails to place on his special list,
may still be carried in American vessels. But as the goods must be foreign-owned, they
are likely to be enemy-owned, thus exposing the American carrier to special danger. If
the purpose of the Act is to save the lives of American seamen, as Senator Pittman con-
tended, then logically American ships ought not to carry anything to belligerents.
5. President Roosevelt in his Chautauqua address of August 14, 1936, uttered a
profound truth when he said: "The effective maintenance of American neutrality de-
pends today, as in the past, on the wisdom and determination of whoever at the moment
occupy the offices of President and Secretary of State."
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entanglement by removing the opportunity or the temptation to injure
American life or property. American citizens may still freely travel on
non-belligerent vessels in the war zones, where, however, they should be
deemed to assume all the risks.
Several features of the Act warrant special comment. The provision
of Section 4 which exempts from the operation of the Act, with certain
exceptions, American republics at war with a non-American state, goes
much beyond the Monroe Doctrine, and is a gratuitous promise of un-
neutrality and therefore of probable intervention in wars which it may
not be in the American interest to join. The permitted exception of
Canada and Mexico from the provisions of the embargo on discretionary
commodities may prove embarrassing in refuting protests from an enemy
of Great Britain.
The Act also applies to "civil strife", if the President thinks it of
sufficient magnitude or conducted under such conditions that the export
of arms and ammunition would endanger the peace of the United States.
This is a curious provision. It was incorporated as a result of the Jan-
uary, 1937, Resolution prohibiting the shipment of arms to Spain, a
resolution enacted in the belief that it would help the Non-Intervention
Committee in London enforce non-intervention in Spain and prevent the
spread of the Spanish civil war. In fact, it operated to disable the recog-
nized government of Spain from purchasing here the arms which inter-
national law, the commercial treaty and American precedents entitled
the government to obtain, and placed the Franco rebels, whose belliger-
ency was not then recognized (unless the Resolution accomplished that
result) on a parity with the legitimate government. The motive was not
bad, but the result was not to prevent intervention in Spain. The belated
effort in May, 1938, to lift the embargo against the Loyalists would
now be unneutral and would not compensate for the earlier departure
from precedent. In a civil war on the American continent, the Act would
conflict with the treaties of Havana (1928) and Buenos Aires (1936),
which oblige third countries to assist the legitimate government against
rebels, and this is the way in which the Congressional Resolutions of
1912 and 1922 on the supply of arms to countries in revolution have been
construed.
The mandatory embargo on arms, etc., and the discretionary embargo
which the President may impose on secondary commodities apply not
only to shipments to belligerents, but "to neutral states for transshipment
to such belligerents". This seems unwise. It compels the United States
to determine whether a shipment destined to a neutral country, even
though paid for and going in a foreign vessel, will find its way into a
belligerent country. It is a new application of the doctrine of continuous
voyage or transport, always vigorously protested by neutrals as an im-
proper interference with inter-neutral trade. Now, in the zeal to choke
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trade, the United States assumes the self-injuring burden of undertaking
to pass on the difficult question of whether a commodity destined to
neutrals is likely to reach a belligerent and thus bring into force the
provisions for cash payment, non-American carrier, license, etc. And
if the quarrels with the belligerents are thereby thought to be avoided,
it may be said that the capturing belligerent may not agree with the
administration's decision and that neutral countries may object on general
and on treaty grounds to have their legitimate trade thus impaired.
IV
On the first occasion for the application of the Act of 1937, the war
in China, the administration declined to put it into effect. The reason
has not been stated, except that the President does not "find" that a
"state of war" exists. One teacher has told us that there is no state of
war because China and Japan have not called it a war, because they
maintained in 1937-very faintly-diplomatic and consular relations-
now severed-and because third states have not proclaimed their neu-
trality, although it is added, without evidence, that these states operate
on the principle that they are not bound by the obligations of neutrality.
"If the law supposes that," said Mr. Bumble, " . . . the lav is a ass,
a idiot." Such misconceptions should not prevail. War is a fact and
does not depend for its recognition as such upon a declaration of war,
upon the names the parties assign to their conflict, upon a proclamation
of neutrality, or upon the special condition of their diplomatic relations.
In a war not conducted at sea, proclamations of neutrality are not com-
mon and belligerents may for reasons of policy not exert their full
belligerent rights. In Europe, as during the Franco-Prussian War, it
has not been uncommon to continue reciprocal trade during war and
consuls are not always withdrawn. The Foreign Offices of European
countries are doubtless applying to the Sino-Japanese War the appro-
priate rules of neutrality, as presumably is the Department of State.
for none would seek to expose itself to the charge of taking sides and
incurring the enmity or reprisals of the belligerent discriminated against.
Even in the shipment of arms to both belligerents, neutrality is being
observed. To conclude that the conflict now raging in the Far East is
not a state of war is to open up vistas of future large-scale slaughter
in a state of perfect peace. This is the road to anarchy.
In the revision of the Neutrality Act which will probably be under-
taken in the January, 1939, session of Congress, it is believed that
Congress should either (a) repeal the entire Act and depend on the rules
of international law, the existing neutrality statutes and the constitu-
tional duty of the President not to involve the United States in a foreign
war, or (b) reserving to itself, with the President, the privilege of
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determining the existence of a "state of war", Congress should retain
the present Act, amending it in the particulars above mentioned only.
The second alternative is preferable.
It is the writer's opinion that the United States, as a strong neutral,
has at its disposal the necessary means to insist upon the observance
of its rights as a neutral. The fact is that practically all the provisions
in the Act, outside of the "'cash-and-carry" section, could have been
applied by the Wilson Administration, had there been then a serious
purpose to prevent American entanglement. Congress, in 1916, was
eager to pass the Gore-McLemore Resolutions providing in effect that
American citizens took passage on armed belligerent vessels at their own
risk, a rule of common law and common sense so elementary that it
really required no legislation to affirm it; the prohibition of loans needed
only an Executive frown; Congress granted unsolicited the unused power
of reprisal and would willingly have placed an embargo on arms until
both sides respected American neutral rights. An Executive order pro-
hibited the use of American ports as bases of supply and could have
prevented the admission of submarines and armed merchant vessels. It
was not the absence of statutes which produced American entanglement.
And while the enactment of the present statute is an expression of Con-
gressional purpose and a direction to the Executive, there is in it no
guaranty of American neutrality.
But with the passing of the emotional faith in sanctions, the demand
for Executive discretion to act unneutrally may diminish. The cash-and-
carry policy, however well intentioned, has aroused so much justifiable
criticism that it is hoped that it may be repealed. So should be the
provisions for unneutrality in a war in which a Latin-American country
is engaged, the provisions relating to civil war, and the injurious pro-
visions relating to American enforcement of the continuous voyage or
transport doctrine on American trade. The belief that embargoes prevent
involvement, or should be used to chastise, disarm, or starve foreign
belligerents should be dissipated, for not only are embargoes ineffective
to that end but they set in motion collateral and consequential forces
dangerous to peace and the well-being of the American and foreign
people. Twenty years of effort to set up new ways of running the world
have produced only confusion and an intensification of nationalism and
armament heretofore unknown. Now, international law and experience,
including the time-honored practice of neutrality, may justly claim the
right to be heard again.
This does not mean that no change in the rules can be discussed. On
the contrary, the calling of a Third Hague Conference to deal with and
to strengthen the rights of neutrals against submergence by belligerent
encroachment would be a sign of returning balance and reconstruction.
The uses of the air arm, the submarine and the abuses of the Great War
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by belligerents must receive considered attention as among the essential
conditions to any possibility of a limitation of armaments. Belligerents
must be limited in their privilege of interdicting neutral trade by an
abuse of the conceptions of contraband, blockade and continuous trans-
port. Expansion in the lists of contraband in the late War not only ruined
the safeguards for neutrals in the Declaration of Paris, but made the
position of the neutral carrier worse than it was before 1856, when at
least it received freight. The category of contraband must be limited to
its original function of controlling the supply of lethal weapons and
admitted military equipment.' And it seems especially important that
the provision of the Rio Janeiro Anti-War Treaty of 1933 by which the
signatories, including the United States, agree to adopt in their character
as neutrals a solidary attitude, should be universalized. Very little has
been done to carry out this commitment. The Havana Convention of
1928 contains a code of neutrality, not greatly different from the estab-
lished law. But whereas the United States declined in 1914 to cooperate
with the Scandinavian neutrals in preserving the rights of neutrals, in
which all have a common interest and need a common front, as in 1780
and 1800, the demand for such cooperative action is now more insistent;
and as part of a Hague Convention or otherwise provision for such
unity should now be initiated.
The failure of the attempts of recent years to discountenance neutrality
as a philosophy and a practice should have done something to restore
its prestige. Those who took the long view of national evolution and
international relations never had much doubt on that score. To be sure,
neutrality is not a cure for war and makes no such professions. But
it has done much to place non-intervention in foreign wars on a legal
basis, has done much to ameliorate the duration and the barbarity of
war, has narrowed the area of conflict, has kept a large part of the
world at peace, and has been conducive to the making of sensible treaties
of peace. In a world of motley competitive nations this is no mean
achievement. However much we may work upon removing the causes
of conflict, upon devising methods of international cooperation and peace-
ful processes of settling conflicts, it would be a mistake to weaken
neutrality. Especially is this true in the United States, whose entire
history is associated with the growth of neutrality and advantage from
its practice.
6. The fact that so much trade is now state-owned or controlled will necessarily
expand the duties bf neutrals.
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